Wednesday, April 16, 2014

Lease of Immovable Property Under Transfer of Property Act, 1882


Lease can be of a movable or an immovable property. It is a contractual arrangement calling for the lessee (user) to pay the lessor (owner) for use of an asset.

Under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (in short T.P.Act) the subject of “Leases of Immovable Property” is dealt with in Chapter 5.

Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines a lease of immovable properties as transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms.

Definition of lessor, lessee, premium and rent: - The transferor is called the lessor; the transferee is called the lessee; the price is called the premium; and the money, share, service or other thing to be so rendered is called the rent.

Essential elements of lease: - 

(i) immovable property; 
(ii) right to enjoy such immovable property; 
(iii) the ascertainable duration of the lease; 
(iv) the parties that is the transferor and the transferee who are competent to make contract; 
(v) the consideration that is premium or rent.

The lease for more than one year cannot be created unless it is registered.
In Anthony vs. K.C.Ittoop & Sons and Others, (2001) 1. M.L.J, 12, the Supreme Court found that there are three interdictions to claim that an instrument can create a valid lease in law. 

The first inhibition is that it should be in accordance with the provisions of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. That Section reads as under- A lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument.

The second inhibition, as pointed out by the Supreme Court, is Section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act, which states that where a lease of immovable property from year to year or for any term exceeding one year or reserving an yearly rent, such document should be compulsorily registered.

The third inhibition, as noted by the Supreme Court, is Section 49 of the Registration Act relating to the consequence of non-compliance of Section 17. Section 49(c) contemplates that no document required by Section 17 or by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act to be registered shall be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property of conferring such power, unless it has been registered.

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, taking into consideration of the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, found that an unregistered lease deed may be taken as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument.

It is well settled proportion of law that in absence of a registered lease the tenancy at best can be regarded as from month to month. A covenant for renewal contained in a lease does not ipso facto extend the tenure of the lease. If to the renewed lease, the requirements of registration are compulsory, no valid lease would come into existence unless registration is made (Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs. Vummidi Kannan AIR 1992 Mad. 190).


The Delhi High Court in M/s MTZ Industries Ltd vs. Mr. K.C.Khosla, on 6.7.2010 observed that as appellant having become a tenant on a month to month basis after 1.7.1992, the only manner in which he could be evicted from the suit property was by serving upon him a valid legal notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Court further observed that no particular form is necessary for a notice under Section 106 of the T.P.Act.

If under the document a party gets exclusive possession of the property, prima facie, he is considered to be a tenant; but circumstances may be established which negative the intention to create a lease. The Supreme Court in Associated Hotels of India Ltd vs. R.N.Kapoor, 1960 SCR (1) 368 has observed that- the real test is the intention of the parties- whether they intended to create a lease or license. If an interest in the property is created by the deed it is a lease but if the document only permits another person to make use of the property of which the legal possession continues with the owner, it is a license.


The Supreme Court of India in Pradeep Oil Corporation vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi &… on 6 April, 2011 has observed that the appellant is in possession of the building in question since 1958. They have been permitted to raise huge constructions and the nature of construction is of wide range. An administration block along with tanks for storing petroleum had been constructed. A boundary wall around installations and administrative block had also been constructed. Admittedly, the grantee is in exclusive possession over the lands in question along with construction thereon without any let or hindrance from the Administration. 

Further, the appellant had been continuously carrying on their business without any interference from any quarter whatsoever since 1962. As in the instant case, exclusive possession has been granted, there is a strong presumption in favor of tenancy. That being the case, it is for the appellant to show that despite the right to possess the demised premises exclusive, a right or interest in the property has not been created. 

The Supreme Court also notice the undisputed fact that in the present case the parties have agreed that for the purpose of determination of the agreement three calendar months’ notice had to be given. Undoubtedly, such clause in the document in question has a significant role to play in the matter of construction of document. Clearly, if the parties to the agreement intended that by reason of such agreement merely a license would be created such a term could not have been inserted. It is well settled legal position that a license can be revoked at any time at the pleasure of the licensor.

The brief fact of the instant case is as follows: - The appellant had been granted under the Government Grant Act separate and distinct licenses by the President of India acting through Superintendent of Northern Railway, Delhi for the purpose of maintain depot for storage of petroleum products at a yearly license fee of Rs. 20,640/- and Rs. 31,000/- per annum respectively. Under the aforesaid grant, the appellant had been given the right to erect/construct ‘petroleum installation buildings’ consists of petroleum tanks, buildings and other conveniences for receiving and storing therein petroleum in bulk and consequently possession of land has been given.

Consequent to the said agreement the administration granted ‘exclusive possession’ of the said land to the appellant who entered the land for the purpose and the terms mentioned therein in the aforesaid agreement/grant. Consequently, the appellant submitted layout building plans for the construction of the Oil Depot and the standing committee of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (in short MCD) approved the layout plan for the construction of 10 Oil Storage tanks of petroleum products. Subsequent to that the appellant raised various constructions comprising of an administration block etc. along with huge petroleum storage tanks for storing petroleum products. A boundary wall around the installations and the administrative block was also constructed.

The respondent MCD vide its order dated 17.08.1984 passed an assessment order with regard to the property tax qua the aforesaid property and confirmed the ratable value proposed by it.

The said assessment order was challenged by the appellant before the appellate Court/MCD Tribunal which vide its order dated 17.07.1985 set aside the assessment order passed by the respondent MCD and held that the appellant is only a licensee in the property and is not a tenant, therefore, no property tax can be levied on the appellate under Section 20(2) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957.

Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the appellate Court, the respondent MCD filed a writ petition. However the said writ petition was dismissed by the Ld. Single Judge of the Delhi High Court on 5.08.1986-held that the grant in favor of the petitioner was a license and hence the petitioner is not liable for the payment of any property tax in respect of the land or the petroleum storage tanks.

Challenging the aforesaid order of Ld. Single Judge, an LPA was filed and subsequently the same was referred to a Full Bench of High Court.


The Full Bench of the High Court vide its impugned judgment and order dated 17.09.2002 held that the petroleum storage tanks are a building and the petitioner was a lessee and not a licensee in the property in question. 

The Apex Court upheld the findings of the Full Bench of High Court and held that the documents in question constitutes lease in favor of the appellant-grantee; and accordingly liable to pay taxes.     

Section 111 deals with the question of determination of a lease, and in various clauses (a) to (h) methods of determination of a lease of immovable property are provided. In the case of a landlord wishing to evict his tenant under the Rent Acts determination of the lease in accordance with the Transfer of Property Act is unnecessary (V.Dhanapal Chettiar vs. Yesodaiammal, AIR 1979 SC 1745).

Under the Rent Control Act, a tenant can be evicted only on specific grounds enumerated under the specific provisions of the Rent Control Act.

A tenant is not permitted to dispute the title of the landlord. Even if the landlord is himself a trespasser, he can maintain a suit for eviction as against his tenant (Vithalbhai Pvt Ltd vs. Union Bank of India, AIR 1992 Cal 283).




Disclaimer:- All the contents are for general use and information. Consult your Lawyer before acting upon these information.

Saturday, April 5, 2014

Res Judicata : Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure

Meaning

Res judicata is the Latin term for “a matter already judged”.

Origin

The Principle of res judicata is founded on the ancient Indian principle of prangnyaya (previous judgment). The principle is stated in “Brihaspati Samriti” as “if a person who has been defeated in a suit according to law  files the plaint once again he must be told that he has been defeated already; this is called plea of prang-nyaya”.

Law

Under Code of Civil Procedure  (in short CPC), Section 11 incorporates the principle of res judicata which reads as follows: “No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court”.

Conditions

To constitute a matter as res judicata under Section 11, CPC the following conditions must be satisfied-

(i) The matter must be directly and substantially in issue in the former suit and in the latter suit,

(ii) The prior suit should be between the same parties or persons claiming under them,

(iii) The parties should have litigated under the same title in the earlier suit,

(iv) The Court which determined the earlier suit must be competent to try the later suit (subject to Explanation 8 of Section 11 CPC),

(v) The question directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit should have been heard and finally decided in the earlier suit (Alka Gupta vs Narendra Kumar Gupta, AIR 2011 SC 9).

Illustrations

 (i) A file a suit against B for declaration that he is entitled for certain lands as heirs of C. The suit is dismissed. In a subsequent suit he claims the same property on the ground of adverse possession. The rule of res judicata will not apply, because the issue in the two cases is different. The previous case involved the issue of succession whereas the latter case involved the issue relating to the adverse possession.

(ii) A sues B for possession of certain properties on the basis of a sale deed in his favour. B impugns the deed as fictitious. The plea is upheld and suit is dismissed. A subsequent suit for some other properties on the basis of the same sale deed is barred, as the issue about the fictitious nature of the sale deed was actually in issue in the former suit directly and substantially.

(iii) A files an eviction petition against B, the tenant, on the ground of misuse of the tenanted premises. During the eviction proceedings before the Rent Controller A and B enter into a compromise on the understanding that B shall not misuse the premises and A shall withdraw the suit, on the basis of which the Court granted a compromise decree. Subsequently A files another eviction petition against B on the ground of bona fide requirement. The rule of res judicata will not apply, as the issue is different in the two cases.
     
Writ petitions

Writ petition under Article 226 dismissed by High Court after hearing on merits, subsequent petition under Article 32 by the same parties and for same reliefs will be barred by principle of res judicata (Direct Recruitment Class II Engineering Officer Association & Others vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1990 SC 1607).


Did you know?

(i) The principle of res judicata is not made applicable to cases of habeas corpus petitions. Therefore, even after the dismissal of one petition of habeas corpus, a second petition is maintainable if fresh, new or additional grounds are available. 

(ii) The general principles of res judicata apply to different stages of the same suit or proceeding.

(iii) If a petitioner withdraws the petition without the leave of the Court to institute a fresh petition on the same subject matter, the fresh petition is not maintainable.

(iv) An adjudication will operate as res judicata between co-defendants if there is a conflict of interest between them and it is necessary to resolve the same by a Court in order to give relief to the plaintiff and similarly an adjudication will operates as res judicata between co-plaintiff if there is a conflict of interest between plaintiffs and it is necessary to resolve the same by a Court in order to give relief to a defendant.

Case Laws

The Supreme Court in Ashok Leyland Ltd vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2004) 3 SCC 1 has observed that the principle of res judicata is a procedural provision. A jurisdictional question if wrongly decided would not attract the principle of res judicata. When an order is passed without jurisdiction, the same becomes a nullity. When an order is a nullity, it cannot be supported by invoking the procedural principles like, estoppels, waiver or res judicata.

A rule of procedure cannot supersede the law of the land (Mathura Prasad vs. Dossibai, AIR 1971 SC 2355).

In M. Nagabhusana vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 2011 SC 1113, the Apex Court has observed that the doctrine of res judicata is not technical doctrine but a fundamental principle which sustains rule of law in ensuring finality in litigation. The principle of res judicata are of universal application as it is based on two age old principles, namely “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” which means that it is in the interest of the state that there should be an end to litigation and the other principle is “nemo debet lis vexari si constat curiae quod sit pro una et eadem causa” meaning thereby that no one ought to be vexed twice in a litigation if it appears to the Court that it is for one and the same cause.

In Prahlad Singh vs. Col. Sukhdev Singh, AIR 1987 SC 1145, the Supreme Court has held that interlocutory decisions given by a Court at earlier stage is binding on the subsequent stage of the suit.

Interlocutory judgments which have the force of a decree must be distinguished from other interlocutory judgments which are a step towards the decisions of the dispute between parties by way of a decree or a final order.

An interlocutory order which had not been appealed from either because no appeal lay or even though an appeal lay an appeal was not taken could be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order.




Disclaimer: All the contents are for general use and information. Consult your Lawyer before acting.